Abstract-We study a network security game where strategic players choose their investments in security. Since a player's investment can reduce the propagation of computer viruses, a key feature of the game is the positive externality exerted by the investment. With selfish players, unfortunately, the overall network security can be far from optimum. The contributions of this paper are as follows. 1) We first characterize the price of anarchy (POA) in the strategic-form game under an "Effective-investment" model and a "Bad-traffic" model, and give insight on how the POA depends on individual players' cost functions and their mutual influence. We also introduce the concept of "weighted POA" to bound the region of payoff vectors. 2) In a repeated game, players have more incentive to cooperate for their long term interests. We consider the socially best outcome that can be supported by the repeated game, as compared to the social optimum. 3) Next, we compare the benefits of improving security technology and improving incentives, and show that improving technology alone may not offset the price of anarchy. 4) Finally, we characterize the performance of correlated equilibrium (CE). Although the paper focuses on network security, many results are generally applicable to games with positive externalities.
I. INTRODUCTION
N ETWORK security depends not only on the security-related investment made by individual users, but also on the interdependency among them. If a careless user puts in little effort in protecting his computer system, then it is easy for viruses to infect this computer and through it continue to infect others. On the contrary, if a user invests more to protect himself, then other users will also benefit since the chance of contagious infection is reduced. Therefore, each user's investment has a "positive externality" on other users. Since selfish users do not consider the externality when choosing their investments, the overall network security can be far from optimum. In this paper, we are interested in identifying and modeling the important factors that affect the extent of suboptimality, i.e., the "price of anarchy," and also consider possible ways to improve the outcome.
One important factor is the heterogeneity of user preferences. Internet users have different valuations of security and different unit cost of investment. For example, government and commercial Web sites usually have higher valuations of security since security breaches would lead to significant financial losses or other consequences. They are also more efficient in implementing security measures. On the other hand, a family computer user may care less about security, and also may be less efficient in improving it due to the lack of awareness and expertise. As a result, some players may choose to invest more, whereas others choose to "free ride," given that the security level is already "good" enough due to the investment of others. Due to the tendency of underinvestment, the resulting outcome may be far worse for all users. This is the "free-riding problem" as studied in, for example, [2] .
Besides user preferences, the logical dependency among the users is also important. Consider a local network where user directly connected to the Internet, and all other users are connected to and exchange a large amount of traffic with . Then, the security level of is particularly important for the local network since has the largest influence on other users. If has a low valuation of its own security, then it will invest little and the whole network suffers.
In this paper, we study how users' preference and their mutual dependency affect network security in a noncooperative setting. Our model is quite general and can be used in a number of scenarios. Examples include: 1) Internet with a large number of players 1 (where each player can be an enterprise or organization) subject to epidemic risks such as viruses, worms, and Botnets; and 2) subnets or local area networks within an organization. Once an external attacker has infected one of the players, he has the opportunity of further attacking others by exploiting the internal links.
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. 1) In the strategic-form game (Section II), we derive the "Price of Anarchy" (POA) [8] [i.e., the largest possible ratio between the "social cost" at a Nash Equilibrium (NE) and social optimum (SO)] under an Effective-investment (EI) model and a Bad-traffic (BT) model. In particular, these results show that the POA tends to increase with the dependency among the players, the network size, and the imbalance of network traffic. For example, in the EI model, each player has a "social importance," which represents the importance of his investment to the society. It is shown that the POA is bounded by the maximal social importance among all players. 2) In a repeated game (Section III), users have more incentive to cooperate for their long-term interest. Since in general there is a large set of equilibriums in the repeated game, we study the "socially best" equilibrium and compare it to the Social Optimum. Not surprisingly, much better performance can be achieved than in the strategic-form game. However, repeated game requires more coordination and information among the players. 3) Security technology is improving with time and can deal with security risks more efficiently. Given this, is it still necessary to improve the incentives of security investments? In Section IV, we compare the benefits of improving security technology and improving incentives and show that technology improvement alone may not offset the price of anarchy due to the lack of incentives. 4) Finally, we consider the performance of correlated equilibrium (CE) (a more general notion than NE), which could capture implicit coordination among the players. In Section V, our initial investigation shows that CE can provide performance gain over NE in the security game. We also show that the performance bounds of the worst-case discrete CE coincide with the POAs of NE under our EI model and BT model.
A. Related Works
In [1] , Gordon and Loeb presented an economic model to determine the optimum investment of a single player to protect a given set of information. The model takes into account the vulnerability of the information and the potential loss if a security breach occurs. The externalities among different players, or the game-theoretical aspects, were not considered.
Varian studied the network security problem using game theory in [2] , where each player decides on a level of investment, and the players' investments affect the security of each other. Reference [2] identifies network security as a public good and shows that there is a free-riding problem that can significantly reduce the social welfare. However, in the models of [2] , each player's investment is assumed to be equally important to all users (i.e., a symmetric case). In [3] and [4] , Kunreuther and Heal proposed a model of interdependent security (IDS) for a range of problems including computer security. In this model, a player decides on whether or not to invest in a security mechanism, and he can suffer from "direct loss" and "indirect loss" as determined by the decisions of himself and others. However, the studies in [2] - [4] were not focused on the analysis of POA as in this paper.
In [5] , Aspnes et al. formulated an "inoculation game" and studied its POA. There, each player in the network decides whether to install antivirus software that can completely avoid infection. Unlike our work, [5] has assumed binary decisions and the same cost function for all players. Lelarge and Bolot [7] made a similar homogeneous assumption on the cost functions, and they obtained asymptotic results on the POA in random graphs when the number of players goes to infinity.
Comparatively, our results take into account heterogeneous cost functions and apply to any given network topology (i.e., players' logical dependency) with any number of players.
POA [8] , measuring the performance of the worst-case equilibrium compared to the social optimum, has been studied in various games in recent years. For example, Roughgarden et al. shows that the POA is generally unbounded in the "selfish routing game" [9] , [10] , where each user chooses some link(s) to send his traffic in order to minimize his congestion delay. Ozdaglar et al. derived the POA in a "price competition game" in [11] and [12] , where a number of network service providers choose their prices to attract users and maximize their own revenues. In [13] , Johari et al. studied a "resource allocation game" where each user bids for the resource to maximize his payoff. Many of the games exhibit "negative externalities" among the players: e.g., in the "selfish routing game", if a user sends his traffic through a link, other users who share that link suffer larger delays.
In the network security game we study here, if a user increases his investment, the security level of other users also improves. Therefore, each player's investment has a positive externality (or equivalently, his underinvestment has a negative externality). In fact, many results here may be applicable to games with a similar nature. For example, assume that a number of service providers (SPs) build networks that are interconnected. If a SP invests to upgrade her own network, the performance of the whole network improves and may bring more revenue to all SPs.
Another body of literature focuses on the games between the attackers and defenders in information security. For example, [14] and [15] discussed the benefit and challenges of applying game theory in the domain of information warfare. Reference [16] studied a game where the attacker tries to tamper with the bits in order to maximize the error probability of the intended receiver.
II. PRICE OF ANARCHY (POA) IN THE STRATEGIC-FORM GAME
In this section, we consider the POA in the strategic-form game. We first formulate a general model that reflects the positive externality of security investment and give a generic bound of the POA. Then, we study an EI model and a BT model, both of which are special cases of the general model, but describe more specifically how the players' investments benefit each other. We show that the POA under these models tends to increase with the dependencies among the players, the network size, and the imbalance of network traffic.
A. General Model
Assume there are "players." The security investment (or "effort"; we use them interchangeably) of player is . This includes investment in both finance (e.g., for purchasing/installing antivirus software and firewall) and time/energy (e.g., for system scanning, patching, and maintenance). The cost per unit of investment is . Denote as player 's "security risk": the expected loss due to attacks or virus infections from the network, where is the vector of investments by all players.
is decreasing in each (thus reflecting positive externality) and nonnegative. We assume that it is differentiable and convex. The intuition of the convexity assumption is that with the increase of , the decrease of the security risk becomes slower when is already large. In other words, it is difficult to reduce the risk to 0 even with large investment [see Fig. 1(a) for an example]. Also assume that is finite. Then, the "cost function" of player is
The function can be different for different players. In a Nash game with complete information, 2 player chooses his investment to minimize . First, we prove the following result in Appendix A.
Proposition 1: There exists some pure-strategy NE in this game.
In the following, we consider pure-strategy NE. Let be such a NE, and be a vector of investments at SO, i.e., 2 For simplicity, we assume that the game has complete information, i.e., each player knows the cost functions of other players. We believe that this is an important first step since the POA even in this case is not well understood. To relax the assumption of complete information, one may consider an iterative procedure where each player keeps adjusting his investment based on his observed losses due to viruses in each round. The procedure may converge to a NE under certain conditions. This is an interesting topic for future study.
where is the "social cost." Also denote the unit cost vector . We aim to find the POA, defined as the largest possible , where is the ratio between the social cost at the NE and at the social optimum. For convenience, we write as when there is no confusion.
Before getting to the derivation, we illustrate the POA in a simple example. Assume there are two players with their investments denoted as and . The cost function is , , 2, where is the security risk of both players, and is the total investment. Assume that is nonnegative, decreasing, convex, and satisfies when [ Fig. 1(a) ]. The social cost is . At a NE , , , 2. Denote , then , as shown in Fig. 1(b) . Then, the social cost . Note that (since as ), therefore in Fig. 1(b) , is the area , and is equal to the area of . At SO, on the other hand, the total investment satisfies . Using a similar argument as before, is equal to the area of . Then, the ratio . We will show later that this upper bound is tight. Thus, the POA is 2.
Now we analyze the POA with the general cost function (1). In some sense, it is a generalization of the above example.
Lemma 1: For any NE , satisfies
Note that is the marginal "benefit" to the security of all users by increasing at the NE, whereas is the marginal cost of increasing . The second term in the right-hand side (RHS) of (2) (4) is not less than 1, by the definition of . Thus, if we subtract (nonnegative) from both the numerator and the denominator, the resulting ratio upper-bounds the RHS. That is where is the th element of the vector . Combining cases (i) and (ii) completes the proof. In the following, we give two models of the network security game. Each model defines a concrete form of . They are formulated to capture the key parameters of the system while being amenable to mathematical analysis.
B. Effective-Investment ("EI") Model
We consider an EI model, which generalizes the model in [2] by taking into account the asymmetric importance of different players' investments. In this model, the security risk of player depends on an "effective investment," which we assume is a linear combination of the investments of himself and other players.
Specifically, let be the probability that player is infected by a virus (or suffers an attack), given the amount of efforts every player puts in. The effort of player , , is weighted by , reflecting the "importance" of player to player . Let be the cost of player if he suffers an attack, and be the cost per unit of effort by player . Then, the total cost of player is . For convenience, we "normalize" the expression in the following way. Let the normalized effort be . Then where (so ). We call the "relative importance" of player to player . This is visualized in the example "dependency graph" in Fig. 2(a) , where each vertex stands for a player, and there is a directed edge from to if (and the value of is shown on the edge). Define the function , where is a dummy variable. Then, , where
Assume that is decreasing, nonnegative, convex, and differentiable. Then, also has these properties. Remark: WLOG, we will assume the following cost function: (6) in the rest of the paper since the investment can be normalized (as in the above derivation) such that its coefficient (the unit cost) is 1.
Proposition 2: In the EI model defined, we have (7) Furthermore, the bound is tight. Proof: Let be some NE. Denote . Then, the th element of
From (3), we have . Thus, . Plug this into (2), and we have (8) Equation (7) gives some interesting insight into the game. Since is player 's "relative importance" to player , then is player 's relative importance to the society. Equation (7) shows that the POA is bounded by the maximal social "importance" among the players. Interestingly, the bound does not depend on the specific form of as long as it is convex, decreasing, and nonnegative.
Example 1: Consider the dependency graph in Fig. 2(a) . Note that player 3 has the highest social importance, so . In another special case, if for each pair , either or , then the POA is bounded by the maximum out-degree of the graph plus 1. If all players are equally important to each other, i.e., , then (i.e., POA is the number of players). This also explains why the POA is 2 in the example considered in Fig. 1 .
The following is a worst-case scenario that shows the bound (7) In networks with a large number of users, such as the Internet, the relative importance of player 's investment, 's, are usually quite different for different 's. Also, due to the scale of the network, there tend to be many users for which player 's investment has small impact. This motivates the following example. Assume that a given player has different levels of importance to others [see Fig. 2(b) , where thicker arrows mean higher importance]. Specifically, suppose that the other players can be divided into groups. Let be the set of users in group , where , and , where are constants. Let . Then, by (7), we have
Consider the simple case where (except for group , which may contain fewer than users). Then, as the number of users , one has . Therefore Note that if , one has . Therefore, as increases, the POA bound in the RHS of (9) increases but is 3 Although V (y ) is not differentiable at y = 1, it can be approximated by a differentiable function arbitrarily closely, such as the result of the example is not affected. , however, the RHS of (9) increases without a bound as increases.
As mentioned earlier, the EI model is generalized from a model in [2] . Compared to the IDS model in [3] , there are a few differences. A technical difference is that in IDS, the strategy of each player is binary: whether or not to adopt a security mechanism. In the EI model, similar to [2] , the investment . The second difference is that, according to [3, Sec. 4 .1], the IDS model focuses on the case where each player can make its investment in protection against external attacks, but not against a virus from the internal network, which is assumed to be friendly. In other words, a player's investment is not effective against internal attacks. On the other hand, if the EI model is used in an internal network, a player's investment can reduce the risk of internal attacks. (For further comparison, in [5] , it is assumed that once a player invests in protection, he does not suffer from any attack.)
C. Bad-Traffic ("BT") Model
Next, we consider a new model that is based on the amount of "bad traffic" (e.g., traffic that causes virus infection) from one player to another. Let be the total rate of traffic (including good traffic and bad traffic) from to . How much traffic in does harm to player depends on the investments of both and . Therefore, denote by the probability that player 's traffic to harms player . Clearly, is a nonnegative, decreasing function. We also assume it is convex and differentiable. Then, the rate at which player is infected by the traffic from player is . Let be player 's loss when it is infected by a virus. Then, player 's cost function is as in (6), with
If the "firewall" of each player is symmetric (i.e., it treats the incoming and outgoing traffic in the same way), then it is reasonable to assume that . 
The bound is also tight.
Proof: Let for some NE . Then, the th element
We have where the third equality holds because by assumption. From (3), we know that . Therefore
According to (2) , it follows that (12) Note that is the damage to player caused by player if player is infected by all the traffic sent by , and is the damage to player caused by player if player is infected by all the traffic sent by . Therefore, (11) means that the POA is upper-bounded by the "maximum imbalance" of the network. As a special case, if each pair of the network is "balanced," i.e., , then . To show the bound is tight, we can use a similar example as in Section II-B. Let there be two players, and assume ; . Then, it becomes the same as the previous example when . Therefore, as , and when . In Appendix B, we introduce the concept of Weighted POA to provide a richer characterization of the region of the payoff vectors.
III. REPEATED GAME Unlike the strategic-form game, in repeated games the players have more incentives to cooperate for their long-term interests. For example, in an internal network in a university, or a local area network, the security level of one user has a big impact on others: If a user is poorly protected against external attacks and is infected, the viruses/worms can explore/scan the internal links and pose threats to others. Instead of playing a strategic-form game with a large POA, it is possible for the users to play a repeated game to achieve a better outcome. In this section, we consider the performance gain provided by the repeated game. Since there is a set of equilibriums in the repeated game, we are especially interested in the one that achieves the minimal social cost.
The Folk Theorem [17, p. 157] provides a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) in a repeated game with discounted costs when the discount factor is sufficiently close to 1, to support any cost vector that is Pareto-dominated by the "reservation cost" vector . (Fig. 4 gives an example with two players.) The th element of , , is defined as given that and we denote as a minimizer. is the minimal cost achievable by player when other players are punishing him by making minimal investments 0.
Recall that the cost function is as in (6) . We also make some additional assumptions in this section. 
A. Performance Bound of the Best SPE
According to the Folk Theorem [17, p. 157], any feasible vector can be supported by a SPE. Thus, the set of SPE is quite large in general. By negotiating with each other, the players can agree on some SPE. In this section, we are interested in the performance of the socially "best SPE" that can be supported, i.e., the SPE with the minimum social cost (denoted as ), as compared to the SO. Such a SPE is optimal for the society, provided that it is also rational for individual players.
Note that the best SPE may not achieve the social optimum (see Fig. 4 for an example). To compare them, we consider the performance ratio , where is the optimal social cost, and (13) Since is convex by assumption, due to continuity (14) where is the rationality constraint for each player . Denote by a solution of (14) . Then . To solve (14), we form a partial Lagrangian and pose the problem . Let be the vector of dual variables when the problem is solved (i.e., when the optimal solution is reached). Then, differentiating in terms of , we have the optimality condition if if ( 
15)
Proposition 4: The performance ratio is upper-bounded by . The proof is given in Appendix C. This result can be understood as follows: If for all , then all the rationality constraints are not active at the optimal point of (14) . Thus, individual rationality is not a constraining factor for achieving the social optimum. In this case, , meaning that the best SPE achieves the social optimal. However, if for some , the individual rationality of player prevents the system from achieving social optimum. Larger leads to a poorer performance bound on the best SPE relative to SO. Proposition 4 gives an upper bound on assuming the general cost function . Although it is applicable to the two specific models introduced before, it is not explicitly related to the network parameters. In the following, we give an explicit bound for the EI model.
Proposition 5: In the EI model where , we have where . Proof: The part is straightforward: Since any NE cost vector can be supported by a SPE, the best SPE must be better than the worst NE. The other part is derived from Proposition 4 (its proof is given in [25] due to the limit of space).
Note that the inequality may not give a tight bound, especially when is very small for some . However, in the following simple example, it is tight and shows that the best SPE achieves the social optimum. Assume players, and . Then, the POA in the strategic-form game is according to (7) . In the repeated game, however, the performance ratio (i.e., social optimum is achieved). This illustrates the performance gain resulting from the repeated game.
It should be noted that, however, although repeated games can provide much performance gain, they usually require more coordination and information among the players than strategic-form games. First, the players need to discuss and agree on one SPE they will play among the set of SPEs. Second, the Folk Theorem we have used assumes that the players' actions are observable, such that one player's deviation from his due investment can be detected by other players. There are a few possible ways to realize this in practice. For example, if each player is better off in the SPE than the NE, they may agree to provide the proof of investments to each other in order to sustain the repeated game (the proof may include the evidence of installed antivirus software and firewall, and their proper configurations). This procedure can also be aided by a trusted coordinator (or a network administrator) who can certify the investments. The certification can be either manual (by inspecting the players' computer systems) or automatic (by using special software that resides in the players' systems and report their security settings). Another possibility is that each player has a special software that can remotely test the security settings of other players (for example, by sending "benign viruses"), in which case a coordinator is not necessary.
IV. IMPROVEMENT OF TECHNOLOGY
As the security technology improves with time, a user can achieve a lower security risk by making the same investment as before. As a result, the social cost is likely to decrease. Given the technology improvement, is it still necessary to correct the incentive problem of security investments? In this section, we try to answer this question by studying the impact of technology improvement on the NE performance.
Recall that the general cost function of player is as in (6) . Now, assume that the security technology has improved. We would like to study how effective is technology improvement compared to the improvement of incentives. Assume that the new cost function of player is (16) This means that the effectiveness of the investment vector has improved by times (i.e., the risk decreases faster with than before). Equivalently, if we define , then (16) is , which means a decrease of unit cost if we regard as the investment.
Proposition 6: Denote by the optimal social cost with cost functions (6) , and by the optimal social cost with cost functions (16) . Then That is, the optimal social cost decreases, but cannot decrease more than times.
Proof: First, for all , . Therefore, . Let the optimal investment vector with the improved cost functions be . In the BT model, define , then is still nonnegative, decreasing, and convex, and . Therefore, by Proposition 3, the POA has the same expression as before.
To compare the effect of incentive improvement and technology improvement, consider the following two options to improve the network security.
1) With the current technology, deploy proper incentivizing mechanisms (i.e., "stick and carrot") to achieve the social optimum. 2) All players upgrade to the new technology, without solving the incentive problem. With option 1), the resulting social cost is . With option 2), the social cost is , where is the social cost function after technology improvement, with defined in (16) , and is a NE in the new game. Define , then the ratio between the social costs with option 2) and option 1) is where the last step follows from Proposition 6. Also, by Proposition 7, in the EI or BT model, the largest possible is equal to the POA shown in Propositions 2 and 3 in the worst case. For example, assume the EI model with . Then, in the worst case,
. When the number of players is large, may be much larger than 1.
From this discussion, we see that the technology improvement may not offset the negative effect of the lack of incentives, and solving the incentive problem may be more important than merely counting on new technologies.
V. CORRELATED EQUILIBRIUM (CE)
CE [18] is a more general notion of equilibrium than NE (the set of CEs contains the set of NEs). CE is closely related to mechanism design [19] that can be used to coordinate the actions of the players to achieve better outcomes. As we explain later, CE can also arise from simple and natural dynamics of the players. In this section, we consider the performance bounds of CE. Specifically, we are interested to know whether CE can outperform NE in our security game, and what is the worst-case performance of CE.
Conceptually, one may think of a CE as being implemented with the help of a mediator [20] . Let be a probability distribution over the investment vectors. First, the mediator selects an investment vector with probability . Then, the mediator confidentially recommends to each player the component in . Each player is free to choose whether to obey the mediator's recommendations. is a CE iff it would be a Nash equilibrium for all players to obey the mediator's recommendations. Note that given a recommended , player only knows (i.e., the conditional distribution of other players' recommended actions given ). Then, in a CE, should be a best response to the randomized actions of other players with distribution . CE can also be implemented with a preplay meeting of the players [17] , where they decide the CE they will play. Later they use a device that generates with the distribution and separately tells the th component to player .
Interestingly, CE can also arise from simple and natural dynamics (without coordination via a mediator or a preplay meeting). References [21] and [22] showed that in an infinite repeated game, if each player observes the history of other players' actions and decides his action in each period based on a "regret-minimizing" criterion, then the empirical frequency of the players' actions converge to some CE. In these dynamics, each player does not need to know other players' cost functions, but only their previous actions [21] , [22] . This is quite natural since, in practice, different players tend to adjust their investments based on their observation of others' investments.
For simplicity, in this paper we focus on CE whose support is on a discrete set of investment vectors. We call such a CE a discrete CE. More formally, is a discrete CE iff: 1) it is a CE; and 2) the distribution only assigns positive probabilities to , where , the support of the distribution , is a discrete set of investment vectors. That is,
, where denotes an investment vector, is the cardinality of , and . (However, the action set of each player is still .) First, we need to establish the existence of discrete CEs. Proposition 8: Discrete CE exists in the security game since a pure-strategy NE is clearly a discrete CE, and pure-strategy NE exists (Proposition 1). Also, any randomization over multiple pure-strategy NEs is a discrete CE.
Remark: However, discrete CE is not confined to these two types. We give an example in [25, Appendix A3] . ) We now write down the conditions for a discrete CE with the general cost function (17) If is a discrete CE, then for any with a positive marginal probability (i.e., for some ), is a best response to the conditional distribution , i.e., . (Recall that player can choose his investment from .) Since the objective function in the right-hand side is convex and differentiable in , the first-order condition is if if (18) where can also be simply written as .
A. How Good Can a CE Get?
The first question of interest is: Does there always exist a CE that achieves the SO in the security game? In other words, can we always "coordinate" the players' actions using CE in order to achieve the SO?
The answer is "generally not." A counterexample is as follows. Suppose that there is a unique that minimizes the social cost. If a CE achieves SO, then the CE should have probability 1 on the vector . In other words, each time, the mediator chooses and recommends to player . Then, we have . Since , we have . If the inequality is strict, then player has incentive to invest less than . Therefore, in general, CE cannot achieve SO in this game.
However, a CE can be better than all NEs in the security game. An example is given in [25, Appendix A3] . Although a similar result holds for games with finite action sets [18] , our example is different in nature since the action set of each player is , which is not a finite set.
B. Worst-Case Discrete CE
As mentioned before, CE can result from simple and natural dynamics in an infinitely repeated game without coordination. However, like NEs, the resulting CE may not be efficient. In this section, we consider the POA of discrete CE, which is defined as the performance ratio of the worst discrete CE compared to the SO. In the EI model and BT model, we show that the POA of discrete CE is identical to that of pure-strategy NE derived before, although the set of discrete CE's is larger than the set of pure-strategy NEs in general.
First, the following lemma can be viewed as a generalization of Lemma 1.
Lemma 2: With the general cost function (17) , the POA of discrete CE, denoted as , satisfies where is the set of discrete CEs, the distribution defines a discrete CE, and the expectation is taken over the distribution .
Although the distribution seems quite complicated, the proof of Lemma 2 (given in [25] ) is similar to that of Lemma 1. Using Lemma 2, we prove the following result in [25] .
Proposition 9: In the EI model and the BT model, the POA of discrete CE is the same as the POA of pure-strategy NE. That is, in the EI model and in the BT model
VI. CONCLUSION
We have studied the equilibrium performance of the network security game. Our model explicitly considered the heterogeneous cost functions of the players and their influence to each other. We showed that in the strategic-form game, the POA can be very large and tends to increase with the network size, the dependency, and imbalance among the players. This indicates severe efficiency problems in selfish investment. Not surprisingly, the best equilibrium in the repeated games usually gives much better performance, and it is possible to achieve social optimum if that does not conflict with individual interests. Implementing the strategies to support a SPE in a repeated game, however, needs more information and cooperation among the players.
We have compared the benefits of improving security technology and improving incentives. In particular, we have shown that the POA of pure-strategy NEs is invariant with the improvement of technology under the EI model and the BT model, and the benefit of technology improvement may not offset the price of anarchy. Finally, we have studied the performance of correlated equilibrium (CE). We have shown that although CE cannot achieve SO in general, it can be much better than all pure-strategy NEs. In terms of the worst-case bounds, the POAs of discrete CE are the same as the POAs of pure-strategy NE under the EI model and the BT model.
Given that the POA is large in many scenarios, a natural question is how to design mechanisms to improve the investment incentives for better network security. Possibilities include new protocols, pricing mechanisms, regulations, and cyber-insurance. For example, a conceptually simple scheme with a regulator is called "due care" (see, for example, [2] ). In this scheme, each player is required to invest no less than , the investment in the socially optimal configuration. Otherwise, he is punished according to the negative effect he causes to other players. Although this scheme can in principle achieve the social optimum, it is not easy to implement in practice. First, the optimal level of investment by each user is not easy to know unless a large amount of network information is collected. Secondly, to enforce the scheme, the regulator needs to monitor the players' actual investments, which causes privacy concerns. In the future, we would like to further explore effective and practical schemes to improve the efficiency of security investments. . Consider a modified game where the strategy set of each player is restricted to . Since the set is compact and convex, and the cost function is convex, this is therefore a convex game and has some pure-strategy NE [23] , denoted as . Given , is also a best response in the strategy set because the best response cannot be larger than as shown. Therefore, is also a pure-strategy NE in the original game.
APPENDIX B BOUNDING THE PAYOFF REGIONS USING "WEIGHTED POA"
So far in the literature, the research on POA in various games has largely focused on the worst-case ratio between the social cost (or welfare) achieved at the Nash Equilibria and the social optimum. Note that the social cost (which is the summation of the individual costs of all players) only provides one-dimensional information. Therefore, the POA is also one-dimensional information. However, in any multiplayer game, the players' payoffs form a vector that is multidimensional. Therefore, it is useful to have a richer characterization of the region of the payoff vectors. This region gives much more information because it characterizes the tradeoff between efficiency and fairness among different players.
This motivates us to introduce the concept of "weighted POA," which generalizes POA. With weighted POA, supposing that a NE payoff vector is known, one can bound the region of all feasible payoff vectors. This gives a better comparison between the NE payoff vector and the "Pareto frontier" of the feasible payoff region. Conversely, given any feasible payoff vector, one can bound the region of the possible payoff vectors at all Nash Equilibria. In this example, the POA is a=b; the weighted POA with weight vector w = (1; 0:5) is c=d.)
The "weighted POA,"
, is defined as the largest possible , where
Here, is a weight vector, and is the vector of investments at a NE of the original game, whereas minimizes a weighted social cost . Fig. 5 illustrates the concept of weighted POA in a two-player game. The dashed-dotted curve is the Pareto boundary of the feasible payoff region, and assume that there is a unique NE whose payoff vector (or "cost vector") is marked by the circle. Then, the POA is equal to . The weighted POA with weight vector is . This is because the NE cost vector is on the line , and the cost vector that minimizes is on the line . To obtain , consider a modified game where the cost function of player is Note that, in this game, the NE strategies are the same as the original game: Given any , player 's best response remains the same (since his cost function is only multiplied by a constant). Thus, the two games are strategically equivalent and have the same NEs. As a result, the weighted POA of the original game is exactly the POA in the modified game (note the definition of ). Applying (2) to the modified game, we have (19) Then, one can easily obtain the weighted POA for the EI model and BT model. . Assume there are two players in the game, and , . Also assume that , for , 2. It is easy to verify that , , 2 is a NE, and . One can further find that the boundary (Pareto frontier) of the feasible payoff region in this example is composed of the two axes and the following line segments (the computation is omitted):
which is the dashed line in Fig. 6 .
By Proposition 11, for every weight vector , there is a straight line that lower-bounds the feasible payoff region. After plotting the lower bounds for many different 's, we obtain a bound for the feasible payoff region (Fig. 6) . Note that the bound only depends on the coefficients 's, but not the specific form of and . We see that the feasible region is indeed within the bound. 
When , it is the same as problem (14) that gives the social cost of the best SPE; when , it gives the same solution as the social optimum. According to the theory of convex optimization [24, p. 250] , the "value function" is convex in . Therefore Also, , where is the vector of dual variables when the problem with is solved. Thus Then which completes the proof.
